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Multiple Trusts and Income Tax Avoidance*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the Revenue Act of 1916,1 the trust has been deemed a
separate entity for income taxation purposes. Congress has thus
sanctioned the use of the trust as a tax savings device. Under present
law, a grantor may place cash or other income producing property in
trust, thereby excluding the resulting income from his own tax
liability. If the income is currently distributed to the beneficiary, the
trust is treated as a conduit, and the beneficiary is taxed in the year of
distribution.2 But where the income is accumulated, the tax is payable
by the trust? When this "accumulation trust" is combined with a
multiple trust plan, an approved tax savings instrument may become
an improper income-splitting device.4 This combination and the
resulting income tax consequences provide the subject matter of this
note.
Because each trust is considered a separate taxable entity, the
appeal of the "accumulation trust" increases in direct proportion to
the number of such trusts created by the grantor for the same

beneficiary. Consider the following example: A grantor wishes to place
in trust 200,000 dollars, which generates an annual net income of
12,000 dollars. If one "accumulation trust" is created, the annual tax
is 2,830 dollars.- If ten trusts of 20,000 dollars each are created, the tax

on each is 163 dollars, or a total of 1,630 dollars.' This is a tax saving
*

This note was awarded first prize in the 1969 Estate Planning Competition sponsored by

the First National Bank of Chicago.
I. Ch. 463, § 2(b), 39 Stat. 756. For the present comparable Code section, see INT. REV.
CODE of 1954, § 641.
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 651 & 652.
3. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 661 & 662.
4. Where such a scheme is employed in order to avoid the income tax, the throwback rules
must be avoided if income is to be eventually distributed only at the trust level. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, §§ 665-69. The throwback rules, a concept new with the 1954 Code, attempt to curtail
the appeal of accumulation trusts as a means of income tax avoidance. Generally speaking, the
rules tax the beneficiary on accumulation distributions at the rate he would have been taxed had
the income been distributed in the most recent of the five preceding years in which undistributed
net income existed. The rules are subject to certain limitations which, when combined with a
multiple trust plan, render them relatively ineffective. See, e.g., Ervin, Multiple Accumulative
Trusts and Related Problems under the Income Tax, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 402,405-07 (1956).
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § I(b). This computation allows-for the $100 deduction
permitted by § 642(b); however, the 10% surtax has not been applied.
6. Id. Here, since each trust receives a $100 deduction, there would theoretically be no tax
due if 121 trusts were created.
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of 1,200 dollars. If the trust income were greater, the savings would be
7
even more dramatic.
This illustration presents a long-enduring problem which the
efforts of the Treasury, Congress, and the courts have had little
success in resolving. It is the purpose of this paper to place the
problem in proper perspective through a discussion of the relevant
legislative and judicial activity, to consider and analyze previously
proposed solutions, and to recommend a workable and effective
approach toward solving the problem.
II.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

The use of multiple trusts as a means of tax avoidance has been
under the scrutiny of Congress for over 30 years. Although there were
prior rumblings,8 the first concerted attack on the practice occurred in
1937 when the Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance was
established by Congress at the urging of President Roosevelt. This
committee held extensive hearings at which the Treasury Department
called for legislative action and cited several flagrant abuses by
taxpayers as evidence of the need for reform. 10 Strangely enough,
Congress reacted only by reducing the exemption for trusts from 1,000
dollars to 100 dollars." This change was unresponsive to the principal
problem involved, that of avoiding the progressive rate structure
through the use of multiple entities, and by itself was not of much
concern to one bent on tax avoidance through the use of multiple
trusts. With the exemption one-tenth of what it had been, all the
grantor had to do was to establish ten times as many trusts as before
the change. The change not only failed to deter the wealthy taxpayer
who was shown to be the principal user of multiple trusts for tax
avoidance,' 2 but it served to penalize the less wealthy grantor who
found no great advantage in the use of multiple trusts. Congress did,
however, indicate that further consideration and study would be given
3
to the problem.
7. Assuming income of $100,000, the tax on one accumulation trust would be $55.421. If
10 trusts were created the total tax would be S21,620, a savings of $33,801.
8. Hearings Bejbre the Joint Comnm. on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt.2, at 270 (1937) [hereinafter cited as 1937 Hearings].
9. H.R. Doc. No. 260. 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1937).
10. 1937 Hearings, supra note 8, at 262-87. For example, one thrifty taxpayer created 64
trusts for the benefit of 4 family members resulting in a tax savings of $464,000 in one year.
I1. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 163(a), 52 Stat. 447.
12. Note 8supra, at 262-87.
13. H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 32 (1937).
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It was 1956 before further inquiry into the multiple trust
problem, as such, was made by Congress. 4 In November of that year,
a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee conducted
hearings on a list of "substantive unintended benefits and hardships"
which had been prepared by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation and the Treasury Department. 5 Included in that list was the
problem of the use of multiple trusts for the purpose of income tax
avoidance. The matter was referred to an advisory group chaired by
Professor A. James Casner. The group made its recommendations to
the Ways and Means Committee, which in turn rejected the proposal
and substituted its own approach in the tax package reported out of
the Committee and later passed by the House. The Senate Finance
Committee virtually reinstated the advisory group's proposals
regarding multiple trusts, but this revised bill was twice passed over in
6
the Senate and never brought to a vote.1
III.

COURT DECISIONS

Against this background of legislative activity only three cases
involving the attempted use of multiple trusts have arisen. 7 Of these,
only one meets the question squarely and attempts an analytical
resolution of the problem. Nonetheless, the others are important for
what they do say, and an understanding of them contributes toward a
full appreciation of the problem.
In Boyce v. United States,'8 the settlor executed 90 trust
indentures with the same trustee and same benficiary in each. All of
the indentures were identical in language and were consecutively
numbered. Each was funded with a separate check, and the first
14. The adoption of the five year throwback rule in the 1954 Code was an attempt to curb
the use of accumulatidn trusts generally. For the view that the exceptions to the throwback rules
actually invite the use of multiple trusts see Kamin, Surrey & Warren, The Internal Revenue
Code of1954: Trusts. Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 COLU.i. L. REV. 1237: 1250 n.4l (1954).
15. Hearings on Technical Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code Before a
Subcolnnt. of the House Ways & Means Comnm., 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
16. For a detailed discussion of these conflicting approaches and their relative merits and
shortcomings see notes 42-72 infra and accompanying text. The congressional failure to enact
this tax package was due largely to disagreement over the proper solution to the multiple trust
problem. See Somer, First Case on Multiple Trusts Suggests that Code Revision may not be
Needed, 14 TRUSTS & Es. 363 (1961).
17. Boyce v. United States, 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), affd per curian, 296 F.2d 731

(5th Cir. 1961); Sence v. United States, 394 F.2d 842 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Estelle Morris Trusts, 51
T.C. 20 (1968). In stating that these are the only cases involving multiple trusts, reference is made
only to multiple accumulation trusts for the same beneficiary created by the same grantor. The
term is used throughout this paper in that limited sense unless otherwise stated.
18. 190 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. La.), affd per curia/n, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961).
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income payment was made by 90 separate checks drawn on the same
account. Thereafter, income payments were made by one check
representing the total income of all the trusts. The trustee did not file
income tax returns since no trust earned in excess of 100 dollars per
year. 9 The Commissioner, contending the trusts should be taxed as
one, assessed deficiencies. The trustee sued for a refund.
It was stipulated by the parties that the sole purpose for

attempting to create 90 separate trusts was to avoid income taxes by
dividing the income from the trust into 90 parts, so that each part
would be exempt from liability by reason of the 100 dollar exemption
allotted each trust2 0 The plaintiff boldly argued that congressional
failure to close the existing loophole demanded a "hands-off"

approach by the courts until Congress prescribed a remedy, and
further, that the settlor legally had taken advantage of the loophole 2

The Commissioner advanced two principal arguments. First, it
was urged that form must yield to substance, so that if the
had not in fact done what he purported to do, he must be
what he actually did. Second, the Commissioner argued
"business purpose" doctrine 2 should be applied, and if the

taxpayer
taxed on
that the
taxpayer

could show no substantial purpose other than tax avoidance, the
trusts should be taxed as oneP The court avoided the question of the

applicability of the "business purpose" doctrine to multiple trusts by
relying on the government's theory that in substance only one trust
existed. In so doing, the court applied the "close scrutiny" test 4 and

found that the taxpayer's failure to show compliance with the
19. INT. REV. CODE of 1939, § 142(a)(3), in effect at that time, required the filing of a
return only if net income exceeded $100.
20. 190 F. Supp. at 951.
21. Id. at 952.
22. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
23. 190 F. Supp. at 954. This represented a change in position by the Governmentperhaps as a result of impatience with the failure of Congress to take positive action
against multiple trusts. Until this time the Government had never indicated a change
from its early view that where multiple trusts in fact existed, there was no ground on which to
attempt to treat them as one. See the statement of Paul B. Bruton, an attorney in the Office of
the Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service, in 1937 Hearings, supra note 8, at 266.
Furthermore, although Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) had been decided two years
prior to this assertion, that doctrine was not invoked.
24. "When a taxpayer . . . boldly proclaims that his intent, at least in part, in attempting
to create a trust is to evade taxes, the court should examine the forms used by him . . . and if
his ingenuity fails at any point, the court should not lend him its aid by resolving doubts in his
favor." Morsman v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 18, 22 (8th Cir. 1937). Such "close scrutiny" is
also applied where family transactions are involved. See Doll v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 239
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 725 (1945).
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indentures' requirements that separate records be maintained resulted
in the existence of but one trust for tax purposes 5
Despite the court's finding that multiple trusts did not exist,
Boyce is of importance to the multiple trust problem in three respects.
First, the case demonstrates the new-found intention of the
government to challenge in the courts multiple trusts for the same
beneficiary. Second, the case shows an attempted application of the
"business purpose" test to the problem. Third, the case indicates the
close scrutiny which multiple trusts can be expected to receive.
In Sence v. United States,2 the settlor arbitrarily subdivided
some 1,300 acres of land and placed several of these tracts in nearly
identical trusts for the same primary beneficiary. The taxpayer
contended that tax avoidance was not the motive in executing the nineteen separate trust indentures' Rejecting this contention, and relying
on the "close scrutiny" test, the Court of Claims held the taxpayer's
failure to show that the trusts were in fact maintained and
administered separately required a determination that, for federal tax
purposes, but one trust existed.
The importance of the Sence case is found in the conflicting
views of the Court of Claims and the trial commissioner who initially
decided the case. The trial commissioner had construed Boyce to hold
that "where the principal purpose of the multiple trust plan is tax
avoidance, the trusts will, for tax purposes, be consolidated and taxed
as one. ' 2 This was an unduly expansive reading of the Boyce case,
for that court relied on the taxpayer's motive solely for the purpose of
determining whether to apply the "close scrutiny" test, which, in
turn, led the court to the conclusion that but one trust existed for
federal tax purposes.
Although the trial commissioner brushed aside without challenge
the taxpayer's contention that the trusts were in fact maintained and
administered separately, the Court of Claims considered this question
decisive. It was thus unnecessary to apply the broad rule invoked by
the trial commissioner that such trusts be taxed as one where the
principal purpose of the settlor was tax avoidance?9
Boyce, having declined to base its decision on the "business
purpose" doctrine, and Sence, in declining to apply the "principal
25.
26.

190 F. Supp. at 957.
394 F.2d 842 (Ct. CI. 1968).

27. Id. at 848.
28.

7 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAx REP.

8176, at 72,625.

29. This has come to be known as the "principal purpose" doctrine.
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purpose" test, set the stage for the Tax Court's recent opinion in
Estelle Morris Trusts v. Commissioner." In this case the settlor
executed ten separate trust indentures, each purporting to create one
trust for each of two primary beneficiaries. The indentures varied only
in the periods of accumulation and dates of distribution and
termination. Although the trust property was pooled for
administrative convenience, each trust declaration was administered
separately and acquired separate investments. Furthermore, each trust
filed its own tax return.
The Government, asserting that the twenty purported trusts
constituted a single trust for federal income tax purposes, assessed
deficiencies?' The Tax Court, however, held that each indenture was
intended to, and did in fact, create two separate trusts." The court
next concluded that tax avoidance was a principal motivation in the
creation of ten trusts, rather than one, for each beneficiary? 3 This
finding required the court to determine whether multiple trusts for the
same beneficiary created by a settlor who was principally motivated
by tax avoidance reasons should be treated as separate entities for
income tax purposes. The court answered in the affirmative.
Recounting the long history of congressional concern, but
inactionn the court noted express provisions in other areas of the tax
law disallowing tax benefits where tax avoidance is the motivation.3
It was pointed out that the great difference of opinion as to what
measures should be taken to close the loophole militated toward
invoking the doctrine of judicial restraint 3 The court then stated:
We do not intend to imply that we believe congressional inaction here means
complete sanction of fax avoidance through multiple accumulation trusts.
Rather, we believe the lesson to be learned is that courts should be wary of broadscale incorporation of the doctrine of 'tax avoidance,' or 'business purpose,'
or 'sham' in an area so fraught with its own particular problems and nuances.
At the very least, we are required to limit those judicially-developed
doctrines to
the situations which they were intended to cover 7
30.
31.
32.

51 T.C. 20 (1968).
Id. at 35.
Id. at 36. The court relied on United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 481

(1936) which held that one indenture may create more than one trust provided the intent to do
so is clear. This case was decided three years after the Court's decision in Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1934), yet again that doctrine was not invoked.
33. 51 T.C. at 38.
34. See notes 8-16 supra and accompanying text.
35. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 269, 306(b)(4), 532, 1551.
36. 51 T.C. at 42-43.
37. Id. at 43.
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Thus the court found the "business purpose" test inapplicable to
donative transactions such as the Morris trusts 8 It further stated that

even if a "trust-business purpose" test were applied, the Morris trusts
would meet that test since each was intended to, and did, carry on

substantial "business fuhctions. '

39

All that, remained for the court to

consider was the application of the "close scrutiny" test as used in

Boyce, since tax avoidance had already been found to constitute a
principal motivation of the instant settlor. In doing so, the court
found ample evidence that the Morris trusts had been carefully
maintained and administered as separate entities and were therefore
not subject to consolidation.40

In Estelle Morris Trusts the court recognized the myriad
problems involved in seeking an adequate solution for this difficult
area. In view of the congressional indecision, the court quite properly
declined to assume that it should be the one to fashion a remedy.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Proceeding under the assumption that the courts should properly
leave to Congress the closing of the multiple trust loophole, we shall
now consider the principal solutions offered by the Treasury, the
Congress, and certain commentators. Some conclusions will be made
as to the most advisable approach.
A.

The Consolidation Approach"

This approach was embodied in H.R. 3041,2 which adopted the
38. Id. The court relied on Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965), which involved a
leaseback by the settlor from the trust. That court said: "Ordinarily, any taxpayer may arrange
his affairs so as to minimize his tax liabilities by means which the law permits. . . . [W]here
a grantor gives business property to a valid irrevocable trust over which he retains no
control and then leases it back, it is not necessary for us to inquire as to whether there was a
business reason for making the gift. Admittedly there was none." Id. at 532.
39. 51 T.C. at 43 n.30.
40. Id. at 45.
41. For an excellent discussion of this technique, see Gordon, Multiple Trusts: The
Consolidation Approach, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 25 (1937).
42. H.R. 3041, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). This bill was never reported out of the House
Ways and Means Committee. Instead, the committee adopted a measure which attacked
multiple trusts through revision of the throwback rules. See H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 64 (1960). The latter approach was incorporated into H.R. 9662, a lengthy tax revision
bill passed by the House. However, the Senate Finance Committee version of H.R. 9662
substantially reinstated the Advisory Group's consolidation approach. See S. REP. No. 1616,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 7-10, 33-39 (1960). It has been suggested.that the Senate's subsequent
failure to act on this bill was due largely to the differences of opinion as to how to solve the
multiple trust problem. See Somer, supra note 16, at 363.
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suggestions of the Casner Advisory Group.4 3 By imposing the tax at
the trust level, the technique is'consistent with the existing concept of
recognizing the trust as a separate entity. Where multiple
accumulation trusts were created by the same grantor for
substantially the same primary beneficiary, the trusts would be
consolidated and taxed as one. Thus, under the proposal, offending
trusts would not be allowed to accumulate income at the lower tax
bracket each individual trust would otherwise enjoy. The rule would
not be applicable if the combined trust income were less than 2,000
dollars,44 or if the tax resulting from consolidation were less than the
sum of the taxes computed separately,45 or if the number of such
trusts did not exceed three, no one of which was created within five
years of another4 6
The proposal has been severely criticized by legislators and
commentators 7 Probably the most frequently recurring objections
charge that the proposal is both complex and vague. As to the latter,
it has been stressed that the suggested rule lacks in definitional
standards.4 For example, no definitions were offered for the terms
"primary beneficiary" or "substantially the same." Although it has
been argued that intentional avoidance of strict definitions would
create a risk area which might serve as a deterrent to those inclined to
push the law to its limit,4 9 critics contend that such an approach
would lead to constant litigation, difficult administration, and
unnecessarily difficult estate planning. 0
43. See notes 14-16 supra and accompanying text.
44. This exception recognizes the fact that tax avoidance would not be significant where
the combined income is not substantial. It thus relieves such trusts from the complexities of the
consolidation approach. See Hearings on Advisory Group Recommendations on Subchapter C,
J and K of Internal Revenue Code Before the House Comni. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 178, 184 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 Hearings].
45. This exception, which amounts to a penalty and illogically results in a "heads I win,
tails you lose" proposition for the Government, was dropped in the Senate Finance Committee
version. See S. REP. No. 1616, supra note 42, at 8.
46. This exception is designed to allow some leeway for trusts that may be created for nontax reasons. The Senate Finance Committee version was more restrictive in exempting only two
trusts, and those only if created at a minimum of 8 years apart. Id. The logic in having such an
exception has been criticized as being arbitrary and inconsistent with the basic premise of the
consolidation approach which rejects motivation as the test and assumes that multiple trusts
created by the same grantor for the same beneficiary ought to be taxed as one. See, e.g., S.
SURREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL INCOlE TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 932 (1960 ed.).
47. See generally Hearings on H.R. 9662 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Hearings].
48. See 1959 Hearings, supra note 44, at 180.
49. Id. at 181.
50. See Tomlinson, Multiple Trust Taxation, 96 TRUSTS & Es. 1180, 1182 (1957).
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Perhaps the most substantial criticism of the consolidation
approach is that it requires the adoption of too many complex rules
which would be left to the discretion of the Treasury Department.', It
is apparent that intricate rules must be devised to implement the
proposal and to answer numerous questions. For example, how is the
joint tax to be assessed and allocated in the situation where some, but
not all, of the beneficiaries are substantially the same? Is only the
share of the beneficiary who is substantially the same to be
consolidated or must all the income of each trust be combined so that
the beneficiaries who are not substantially the same are taxed at the
higher rate? If the former, how is allocation of income within the
trust to be made where only some of the beneficiaries are substantially
the same, but where the trustee has wide discretion in making
distributions to the various beneficiaries? What is to be done where
the beneficiaries are as yet unborn or unascertained? If consolidation
is to be effected, should "loss carryovers" be allowed? Should the
trusts be allowed to balance capital gains and losses among each
other, or should each trust compute its own taxable income which is
then lumped with the others? Which trustee is responsible for
consolidating the returns? How are the offending trusts to be located
and identified in the first instance? These unanswered questions
represent but a few of the many involved in bringing together for tax
purposes trusts which may have different characteristics.
In addition to these complexities, the Advisory Group proposal
52
has been characterized as an overreaction to the existing problem.
Whether this is a valid criticism depends upon which statement of the
ultimate objective one accepts. If the objective is to prevent flagrant
abuses, perhaps the criticism is valid. But if the objective is to restrict
even the nominal benefits which flow from utilization of the trust as a
legitimate estate planning device, then the criticism is not appropriate 3
B.
The
approach
solution.P
would be

The Ten Year Throwback Rule

Ways and Means Committee rejected the consolidation
of the Advisory Group and recommended a vastly different
Under the Committee plan, the five year throwback rule
extended to ten years in cases involving certain multiple

5*1. See Sugarman, Estates and Trusts, in 3 HousE Cois,.
REVISION COMPENDIUM

52.
53.
54.

1754-55 (Comm. Print 1959).

1960 Hearings,supra note 48, at 116, 120, 151-52.
See discussion notes 72-74 infra and accompanying text.
Note 42 supra.

ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX
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trusts,55 and the present exceptions to the five year throwback rule
would be made inapplicable to offending multiple trusts.56
This proposal is conceptually unlike the consolidation approach
in that the tax is imposed at the beneficiary level rather than at the
trust level. Although "accumulation distributions" from the first of
the trusts in the designated group remain subject only to the present
five year throwback rule with its ill-conceived exceptions, all
distributions from the second and succeeding trusts would be "thrown
back" to the most recent of the preceding ten years in which
undistributed net income presently existed. 7 No exceptions to the ten
year rule are made; therefore the beneficiary's tax on accumulation
distributions from the second and succeeding trusts is computed as if
the distribution had been included in his income in the year in which
such amount could have been distributed as current income of the
trust.
As proposed by the House, the law would not allow multiple
trust distributees the benefits of the character rules"8 applicable to the
five year throwback rules. 9 Thus, income which is treated as tax exempt
in the hands of the trust would be treated as ordinary income in the
hands of the beneficiary. While this approach seems patently
discriminatory against the beneficiary of a multiple trust group which
may well have been created for non-tax purposes, the inequity could
be corrected by a simple change in the proposed law. However, there
remain more basic deficiencies in this proposal.
This plan varies significantly from the consolidation approach in
that the tax is imposed ultimately on the beneficiary rather than the
trust. Therefore, until the distribution is made, each trust is allowed
to accumulate income at its own individual rate. Upon distribution,
the tax is recomputed at the beneficiary's rate, and credit is given the
beneficiary for the tax paid by the trust. The fault here lies in the fact
that, for the period of accumulation, the trust enjoys the benefit of the
earning power of the difference in the two taxes. Thus, multiple
55.

H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-69 (1960).

56. Id. at 65.
57. Id.
58. The so-called "'character rules' presently provide that where an accumulation
distribution subject to the throwback rules is made, such distribution will be treated as ordinary
income to the beneficiary if so characterized at the time the trust was taxed on the accumulation,
or, if the trust received capital gain treatment, the beneficiary will be taxed similarly. See IT.
REV. CODE Of

59.

1954, § 662(b).

H.R. REP. No. 1231, supra note 55, at 64.
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accumulation trusts which are created principally for tax avoidance
reasons would still be able to effect substantial savings."
The ten year throwback approach is also subject to the criticism
that it would require burdensome recordkeeping on the part of the
trustee who must account for accumulations on a yearly basis. Under
the present throwback rule, this requirement is limited to a period of
five years immediately preceding the accumulation distribution. This
proposal would produce the undesirable requirement that tax records
of the beneficiary be available for the preceding ten years so that the
adjusted tax can be computed.
This proposal, too, provides for an easily avoided tax. The
imposition of an arbitrary ten year limitation leaves maneuvering
room for the patient and skillful planner. Consider the following
example: A wishes to establish a substantial trust for his son B, who
is ten years old, but who is not to receive distributions until he is over
21 years 'of age. A creates trust P (a "parent trust"). In each of the
succeeding twelve years, trust P distributes its annual income to a
separate subsidiary trust. Each year trust P, having distributed its
current income, pays no tax, and each distributee subsidiary is taxed at
its own lower rate. Beginning in the twelfth year, the first subsidiary trust
can make a termination distribution to B without further tax on its
corpus. In each of the succeeding years, the oldest subsidiary trust can
do the same until the last has terminated. In this way the effect of the
progressive rate structure is severely limited.
Another objection to the ten-year throwback proposal is its
conceptual inconsistency. The plan in effect sanctions income
splitting, to a degree, by exempting from coverage the first trust in a
multiple trust group. The proposal arbitrarily seems to say, "We
recognize the trust as a separate entity, but will allow only one to a
beneficiary regardless of the settlor's motives." Instead, Congress
should reach the underlying question of whether a trust should be
treated as a separate taxable entity at all, and if the answer is no, then
impose a throwback rule which reaches back indefinitely and apply it
to all trusts without exception.
The ten year throwback proposal does avoid many of the
complex rules and undefined standards inherent in the consolidation
60. For example, in the hypothetical case posed in note 7 supra, the tax savings through
the use or a multiple trust plan amounted to $33,801. If the accumulated income is retained for
eight years and then distributed, that 533,801 now payable by the beneficiary would have earned
$16,124 at the rate of 5% interest compounded annually. This, of course, would be retained by the
trust.

1190
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approach. Nonetheless, the Senate Finance Committee was flooded

with objections to this proposal" and ultimately adopted the
consolidation approach.
C.

The Unlimited Throwback Rule

Possibly with a mind toward the criticisms voiced in the
preceding section, the Treasury Department's latest proposals to
Congress call for an unlimited throwback rule applicable to all

trusts.12 Ultimately all trust income would be taxed to the beneficiary
when distributed and at the beneficiary's own rate. This approach is

more than an attack on multiple trusts. In reality the assault is
against all accumulation trusts, and the proposal, by virtue of placing
the tax at the beneficiary level, intends that ultimately all trust

income, whether from multiple trusts or a single trust, be taxed to the
beneficiary when distributed and at the beneficiary's own rate.

In order to avoid the complexity of requiring the beneficiary and
the trustee to maintain all previous tax records for the life of the
trust, this proposal includes a three-year averaging device which is
used to determine the rate at which accumulation distributions are
taxed. This averaging device works as follows:
(1) An average annual income is computed by dividing the total accumulated
income distributed by the number of preceding taxable years of the trust from
which the distribution was deemed to have been made.
(2) An average annual tax increase is then computed by adding the average
annual income (as computed in step (1)) to the beneficiary's income for the
present taxable year and the two preceding taxable years; recomputing the
beneficiary's tax for those years taking into account the added income; adding
the increases in tax for those years together; and dividing by three.
(3) This average annual increase in tax is then multiplied by the number of
preceding taxable years of the trust from which the distribution was deemed to
have been made. This amount is the limitation on the beneficiary's tax
liability. . .
61.
191-99.
62.

1960 Hearings, supra note 47, at 116, 120, 134-39, 143-45, 147-51, 164-68, 180-84,
JOINT PUBLICATION OF HOUSE COM.

ON WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE FINANCL

CoMM., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS OF U.S. TREASURY DEPT., 91st Cong., Ist Sess.,
pt. 2, at 164-71 (Comm. Print 1969).
63. Id. at 170. Application of this procedure is demonstrated by the following example:
Assume an accumulation distribution of $9,000 which is deemed to represent three years of
accumulation. This amounts to an average income of $3,000 as a result of applying step one
($9,000 - 3). This amount is then added to the beneficiary's taxable income for the present year
and the two preceeding years, and a new tax is computed for each of those years. Assume that
with the additional $3,000 the beneficiary's tax would be increased by S900, S1,000, and $1,100, in
those three years respectively. This amounts to an average tax increase of $1,000
(S900+SI,000+SI,100)+ 3. The average ($1,000) times the number of years (3) gives the bene-
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This technique has a dual purpose. First, it eliminates the requirement that each beneficiary keep his individual tax records for the life of
the trust. Second, it alleviates the harsh effect of the progressive tax
rate where income is "bunched" in a single year.
The three-year averaging device is subject to the criticism that it
may not accurately reflect the bracket differential of the beneficiary and
the trust over the period of accumulation. For example, consider the
following graphic examples:

Trust Income
Beneficiary's Income

1966
10,000
20,000

CASE 1
1967
10,000
20,000

1968
10,000
45,000

1969
10,000
80,000

1970
10,000
100,000

Assume all the accumulated and current trust income is distributed in
1970. Because the beneficiary's other income is rapidly increasing,
application of the proposed averaging device results in the beneficiary
owing 3,472 dollars more in taxes than if the trust income had been
distributed in the years earned. 4 This in effect is a penalty on accumulation. It is submitted that remedial legislation with the purpose of closing
the multiple trust loophole should not operate as a penalty on trusts
which accumulate income while the beneficiary's other income is taxed
at constantly increasing tax rates.
1966
Trust Income
10,000
Beneficiary's Income 100,000

CASE 2
1967
10,000
80,000

1968
10,000
45,000

1969
10,000
20,000

1970
10,000
20,000

This is the reverse of the first case. Since the lower income years
are the three to be used in applying the averaging device, the income
accumulated in 1966 and 1967 will not be taxed at the high rates which
would have prevailed had the income been distributed when earned.
Thus, the weakness inherent in a short-term averaging device is a
two-way street.
ficiary's maximum tax liability ($3,000). The beneficiary, however, receives a credit for the taxes
paid by the trust at the time of accumulation.
64. These illustrations, for purposes of simplicity, do not take into account any income
earned on the accumulated income itself.
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CASE 3
1966
1967

Trust Income
Beneficiary's Income

10,000
50,000

10,000
50,000
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1968

1969

1970

10,000
0

10,000
0

0
0

Assuming all the accumulated income is distributed in January, 1970,
which is three years after the last income received by the beneficiary,
the tax rate to be applied is exactly the same as the rate at which the
income was accumulated, since there is no other income to be
averaged in. Thus the progressive character of the rate structure is
avoided.
Carrying this one step further by introducing a multiple trust
plan, consider the following hypothetical case: The settlor wishes the
beneficiary to have 10,000 dollars per year for a period of nine years.
The beneficiary has no other income. To achieve the lowest possible
tax burden the settlor creates three trusts. Trust A is funded so as to
produce 10,000 dollars income per year. Trust B will produce 5,000
dollars per year. Trust C will produce 3,333 dollars per year. In this
way each of the three separate trusts can accumulate income at its
own rate, and avoid the progressive rate structure. After three years,
trust A makes a termination distribution which amounts to 30,000
dollars. This will be taxed to the beneficiary at the rate at which it
was accumulated since he has no other income to average in. Three
years later, when the beneficiary has exhausted the first distribution,
and, more importantly, when he has again had no income for three
years, trust B makes a termination distribution of the 30,000 dollars
it has accumulated (6 years x 5,000 dollars). Again this is taxed to the
beneficiary at the' same low rate at which it was accumulated. Three
years later trust C terminates with the same result.
These cases do not demonstrate the only weaknesses in the
Treasury's proposal. Like the ten-year throwback rule recommended
by the House, this proposal fails to prevent accumulation at the lower
rates because it delays collection of the adjusted tax until distribution.
This allows each trust to use the temporary tax savings (the difference
between the accumulation rate and the adjusted rate) until the
accumulation is distributed. This amount alone may represent a
substantial tax savings.65
65.

Note 60 supra.
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The "Principal Purpose" Statute

In the cases previously discussed the Government unsuccessfully
urged the courts to adopt a rule that where the "principal purpose"
of the settlor is to avoid taxes, the trusts will be consolidated and
taxed as one.6 This was the rule applied by the Commissioner who
first decided the Sence case, but the Court of Claims affirmed on a
much narrower holding. 7 The Estelle Morris court expressly rejected
such a rule on the grounds that any change in the tax laws should be
left to Congress.
A statute implementing this type of rule could be drafted in a
form similar to that present in other areas of the code. For example,
section 269 disallows corporate tax benefits which would otherwise be
available by reason of an acquisition if the principal purpose of the
acquisition was tax avoidance. 9 Section 1551 disallows the corporate
surtax exemption or the accumulated earnings credit, which are
normally available with a transfer of assets, if a major purpose in
effecting the transfer was to obtain the exemption or credit.70
A statute of this type is naturally subject to the criticism that it
is too subjective and leaves the taxpayer in the position of having to
satisfy undefined standards. It also leaves much to the discretion of
the Treasury-a criticism also lodged against the Advisory Group
proposal.
Such a statute would allow for flexibility in the use of trusts since
it would result in consolidation of only those trusts where tax
avoidance was found to be tire (or a) principal purpose. A simply
worded statute, avoiding the complexities inherent in the previously
discussed proposals and accompanied by interpretive regulations
outlining the criteria to be considered, would be sufficient.
V.

RECOMMENDED SOLUTION

In discussing the various proposed solutions to the multiple trust
problem, consideration was given to some of the advantages and
disadvantages of each. Before a conclusion can be made as to which is
the most advisable approach, other factors merit consideration.
A basic question, although not determinative by itself, is whether
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

See notes 17-40 supra and accompanying text.
See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 269.
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1551.
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multiple trusts for the same beneficiary should be treated as separate
entities.
There are a number of non-tax reasons why a settlor may wish to
establish more than one trust for the same beneficiary. For example,
a settlor may want to sample the work of several trustees in order to
determine which is the more efficient, or he may wish to give the
trustee more authority with respect to one corpus and less over
another. It may be desirable that separate trusts be maintained in
order to segregate assets or in order to vary the termination and
distribution dates. Likewise a settlor may want to establish separate
trusts having different purposes; that is, one trust for education,
another for maintainance, and so forth. It may also be necessary for
the settlor to establish an additional trust rather than add to an
existing irrevocable trust which has provisions now considered
undesirable.
While there may be legitimate non-tax motivations, it is not so
clear that, as a matter of policy, the beneficiary should receive more
favorable tax consequences where such multiple accumulation trusts
are established. Conceding the justification in creating separate
accumulation trusts for one beneficiary in order to sample the work
of several trustees, does it necessarily follow that this also justifies
taxing each as a separate entity with the result that the effect of the
progressive rate structure is greatly diminished? Should the mere fact
that a settlor creates one trust for maintenance and another for
education result in tax consequences different from those which would
follow had only one trust been created? Those who answer these
questions in the affirmative argue that a consolidation approach
would restrict the legitimate use of such trusts." Consolidation,
however, would merely attempt to close a present loophole which
results in the beneficiary receiving a windfall in the form of tax
savings under the present "separate entity" theory.
Our examination of the proposed solutions reveals that the
present separate entity theory should be retained. However, it is submitted that a simply worded statute authorizing consolidation where tax
avoidance is the principal purpose should be enacted. This conclusion
is based not upon the conceptual soundness of the separate entity
theory, but rather on the complexities, inconsistencies, and weaknesses
of the available alternatives.
71. See Soter, Federal Tax Aspects of Multiple Accumulation Trusts. 31 U. CIN. L. REv.
351, 400 (1962).
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The Casner Advisory Group proposal falters largely on its lack
of definable criteria which could be reasonably administered by the
Treasury,7 and the necessity for complex rules which must
accompany *theproposal.
The suggested changes in the throwback rules, although sound in
the theory that separate trusts for the same beneficiary ought not to
be considered separate taxpaying entities, are themselves subject to
avoidance, or the need for complex implementing rules, or both. As
proposed, neither prevents accumulation at the lower rates before the
tax is adjusted upon distribution.
A "principal purpose" statute avoids these pitfalls. Although the
statute is weakened somewhat by its subjective nature, it is believed
that the Treasury could fairly encourage a cautious, but reasonable,
approach in the use of multiple trusts. Such a proposal would allow
continued income splitting to a degree, but would decrease the
flagrant misuses of multiple trusts.7 3 This limited tax advantage does
not warrant a wholesale attack on all trusts, or even on all multiple
trusts, where a change would place a terrible burden of complex
procedures and bookkeeping on the trustee, the beneficiary, and the
Treasury. Mr. Norman Sugarman, a noted tax authority, has said
that "everytime we attempt to produce more answers in the statute we
seem to create more problems." 4 For this reason, and others, he has
advocated a simply worded statute such as has been recommended
here.75
A "principal purpose" statute would also achieve consistency
with other areas of the code. Sections 269 and 1551, discussed above,
do not take an "overkill" approach, but, rather, are limited in scope
to those cases where the principal purpose of tax avoidance is
expressly found to exist. A more restrictive rule in the trust area
would be unsound.
Finally, it is suggested that if such a statute were enacted,
provision could also be made for an advance ruling in cases where
the settlor is uncertain of the tax results of his plan. This has been
effectively done with section 357 of the Code.
72. See notes 47-51 supra and accompanying text.
73. See Sugarman, supra note 51; 1960 Hearings,supra note 47, at 116, 120, 151-52.
74. Panel Discussions Before the House Conim. on Ways and Means, 86th' Cong., 2d
Sess. 940 (Comm. Print 1960).
75. Id. at 945-46.
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EFFECTIVE DATE

Consideration of a solution to this problem would not be
complete without a discussion of the effective date such legislation
might impose. Af the outset it should be noted that a change in the
income tax laws which apply to trusts already in existence is not
retroactive taxation unless made applicable to distributions or
accumulations made prior to passage. 7 If such legislation, however, is
made effective on a date before the formalities of passage are
completed, as, for example, January 1 of that year, it is generally
77
conceded that such a measure is retroactive in its application.
Retroactive tax legislation is not necessarily unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court has never declared a federal tax law unconstitutional
because of retroactive provisions.78 On the contrary, the Court has
held that retroactivity for a two-year period was valid 9 It is generally
conceded that retroactivity within the current calender year is
unobjectionable!' Moreover, it has been stated that as a practical
matter the only real limitation on retroactive application of a tax
measure is legislative self restraint." This latter assertion could be an
overstatement if the legislature should proceed with far-reaching
retroactive application. In this event the constitutional concept of
"due process" would appear to be applicable, 2 but even this
restriction would be satisfied if adequate notice were provided.
With these basic principles in mind it is worth noting the
proposed effective dates of the Casner Advisory Group proposal and
the recent Treasury Department proposal for an unlimited throwback
rule.
The Casner consolidation approach was to be applied to all
offending trusts created after December 31, 1956, in view of the notice
given the public just prior to that date 3 It was not to be applied, however, to accumulations made by those trusts before the year of
passage. The proposal went further, however, in the cases of so-called
flagrant abuses where five or more offending trusts had been created
in the same year. These trusts would be consolidated regardless of
76. - See generally Novick & Petersberger, Retroactivity in Federal Taxation, 37 TAXES 40732, 499-530 (1959).
77. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. I (1916).
78. Williams, Retroactivity in the Federal Tax Field, 1960 S. CAL. TAX INST. 79, 84.
79. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 (1938). This involved, however, a state tax law.
80. See Williams, supra note 78, at 88.
81. Id. at 79.
82. United States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937).
83. See 1959 Hearings, supra note 44, at 179.
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when created." In response to questions from Chairman Mills of the
House Ways and Means Committee regarding the constitutionality of
this approach, the Treasury's representative pointed out that since the
trusts would be consolidated only for the year of passage and all
future years, the tax would not be objectionable under the prior
Supreme Court decisions. 5 Chairman Mills then stated that he
believed the proposal should apply to all trusts since that was within
the power of Congress. 6
The present Treasury Department proposals appear to have
adopted Chairman Mill's view since the recent proposal for an
unlimited throwback rule is to apply to all trusts, whenever created,
but only with respect to distributions made after the date of
enactment of the proposal.87
In view of the fact that both the Senate Finance Committee and
the House Ways and Means Committee have in the past approved multiple trust legislation which would apply to trusts already in existence, it
seems fair to conclude that if legislation is passed it will apply to
existing trusts regardless of any reliance the settlor, trustee, or
beneficiary may have placed on present law. This does not seem
unfair when one considers that Congress has been attempting to deal
with the problem for well over 30 years. If the recommended
approach is adopted by Congress, it would not be objectionable to
consolidate trusts, whenever created, if the principal purpose of the
settlor was to avoid taxes. With this in mind, a future settlor would
do well to avoid practicing "brinksmanship" if he contemplates the
use of multiple trusts in his estate planning.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The problem of the use of multiple trusts to avoid the progressive
tax rates is real and demands solution. The Estelle Morris court
properly recognized that the solution lies with Congress. Proposals
which have attempted to resolve the problem through the elimination
of most, if not all, possibilities of avoidance are overly complex and
unworkable. Although a settlor may have legitimate non-tax reasons
for creating multiple trusts for the same beneficiary, this is hardly a

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 188.
Id.
Id. at 189.
Note 62 supra, at 171.
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persuasive argument for retention of the separate entity theory.
Nonetheless, the absence of a satisfactory alternative militates toward
retention of the present approach except where tax avoidance is the
principal purpose in creating multiple trusts. Congress should
therefore enact a short, simply stated law to that effect and leave to
the Treasury the publication of adequate guidelines and regulations.
This approach would help meet the great need for simplicity in our
tax laws.
JAMES H. OESER

